2 Officers Doubted Sub Commander's Orders, Admiral Says
 by Steven Lee Myers

HONOLULU, March 6 — As new details emerged about how civilians affected the operations of
the submarine Greeneville on the day it collided with a Japanese vessel, an admiral investigating
the incident testified today that two officers on board had doubts about orders given by the submarine's
commander in the moments before the collision.

Testifying for a second day, the admiral, Rear Adm. Charles H. Griffiths Jr., turned for the first time to
the role of Capt. Robert L. Brandhuber, chief of staff for the Pacific submarine fleet, who was
escorting the civilians and who was the senior officer on board.

Although the Greeneville's captain, Cmdr. Scott D. Waddle, had authority over his submarine, Captain
Brandhuber was in a position to raise questions about what Admiral Griffiths said was a rush to
complete a series of maneuvers.

"I think he should have had a sense that corners were being cut," Admiral Griffiths said. In interviews
after the collision, Captain Brandhuber told investigators, The Associated Press reported, that he
thought Commander Waddle was rushing preparations for the emergency surfacing drill.

Today's testimony also raised questions about whether the crew was reluctant to speak up in front of
Commander Waddle. Even the Greeneville's second-ranking officer, Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, did
not voice doubts he had about the pace of the preparations to surface, including the time spent rising to
periscope depth and the height of the periscope itself during the search of the horizon, Admiral Griffiths
said.

"He was thinking these things, but did not articulate them to the commanding officer or the officer of the
deck," he said.

Much of today's testimony also delved into the Navy's program to build public support by taking
civilians aboard its warships and the extent to which the 16 civilians aboard the Greeneville affected its
schedule and its operations before the collision with the trawler Ehime Maru, leaving nine people lost
and presumed dead.

The Greeneville left behind important crew members on that day because it was cruising for only a few
hours to accommodate a group of civilians, Admiral Griffiths said.

He noted that the Navy generally discouraged submarines from putting to sea solely to carry civilians,
as the Greeneville did on the day of the collision. "This is an exception to the rule," Admiral Griffiths
said, adding that Commander Waddle's superiors had approved the cruise to accommodate the
"significant efforts" the civilians made to get to Hawaii for a submarine ride.

Admiral Griffiths said two civilians who were at control positions, including the helmsman's chair, did
nothing to contribute to the collision and behaved appropriately. But in his remarks and in answers to
questions from the court's presiding officers, he outlined instances in which the civilians at least
indirectly interferred with normal operations.

A fire-control technician who was aware that sonar showed a ship within 2,500 yards did not report
that information to Commander Waddle, at least in part because he felt inhibited speaking up over the
crowd crammed into the control room in the moments before the submarine surfaced and collided with
the Japanese vessel, the Ehime Maru.

"It's a very disturbing thing in that one case that could have made such a difference," Admiral Griffiths
testified. Also, he said, the Greeneville embarked that day with only 106 of its crew of 163 officers and
enlisted sailors. Among those not aboard were the senior sonar operator and senior fire control
technician. "There may have been some missing ingredients," he said.

The admiral's testimony provided still more seemingly damaging details about the operation of the
Greeneville. When the court opened on Monday, he detailed a litany of technical problems, mistakes
and questionable decisions that occurred as the Greeneville surfaced in a maneuver called an
emergency main ballast blow.

As it surfaced abruptly, the submarine's steel rudder, designed to break through Arctic ice floes, knifed
through the Japanese vessel's hull, sinking it within minutes. Nine of 35 Japanese aboard the ship —
four teenage students, two teachers and three crew members — were lost at sea and are presumed
drowned.

A critical sonar display on the Greeneville was broken on the day of the collision, Admiral Griffiths
testified. With the submarine falling behind schedule after lunch for the visitors ran long, the submarine
also rushed through a series of maneuvers required before surfacing, he said.

Commander Waddle also ordered the submarine to prepare to rise to periscope depth in five minutes,
he said, even though it would take at least 10 minutes to do so safely. The Greeneville then spent only
80 seconds at periscope depth, far too short a period, Admiral Griffiths said.

The court of inquiry is not a trial, but rather an investigative forum. It can result in disciplinary actions
ranging from reprimands to courts martial for Commander Waddle, Commander Pfeifer and Lt. j.g.
Michael J. Coen, the officer of the deck at the time of the collision. The court's presiding officers can
recommend disciplinary actions against others as well.

The second day of the inquiry, which is expected to last two weeks or more, began with a tour of the
Greeneville, now in dry dock.

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