The profound national humiliation that President Bush has brought upon the
                  United States may be forgotten temporarily when the American aircrew,
                  held captive in China as this magazine goes to press, return home. But
                  when we finish celebrating, it will be time to assess the damage done, and
                  the dangers invited, by the administration's behavior.

                  To begin such an assessment, we need to review what has happened.

                  On April 1, a Chinese fighter intercepted an American surveillance aircraft
                  flying a routine mission over international waters in the South China Sea.
                  There was a collision. The exact circumstances are as yet unknown. Did
                  the American plane "bank" into the Chinese jet? Or did the Chinese jet
                  bump into the American plane's nose cone? It doesn't matter. What caused
                  the accident were the unusually aggressive and extremely dangerous
                  maneuvers of the Chinese pilot, who was flying so close to the American
                  aircraft as to increase substantially the chances for a collision. There are
                  common sense rules of the road for how the game is played. The Chinese
                  pilot was recklessly violating those rules, like the guy who tailgates two
                  inches off your bumper going 75 miles an hour. In circumstances such as
                  these, it doesn't matter who bumps whom. Blame for the accident falls on
                  the one who deliberately created such a dangerous situation.

                  Much attention has been paid to the particular Chinese pilot, who it seems
                  had a history of just such reckless flying. But this misses the larger point.
                  The decision to fly Chinese fighters dangerously close to American
                  surveillance planes was made by the Chinese government in Beijing, not by
                  any maverick Chinese aviator. In recent months, Chinese fighters had
                  grown increasingly bold in their interception tactics, all part of a broader
                  effort by the Chinese government to flex its muscles in the South China
                  Sea. The Chinese want the United States to get out of the South China
                  Sea. Why? Because it would be a key sea lane in the event of a conflict
                  with Taiwan. Step one in this campaign is forcing American surveillance
                  planes to stay out of the area. So the Chinese government consciously
                  increased the risk to U.S. planes, and to its own pilots, in order to improve
                  its strategic position. The accident, in short, was the direct consequence of
                  a deliberate Chinese policy.

                  The accident also occurred despite repeated warnings by the United States
                  that the new Chinese policy was dangerous. In December and January,
                  after a number of close calls, top Pentagon officials formally protested the
                  new Chinese tactics. The United States, they made clear, did not intend to
                  renounce its right to fly in international airspace, but Chinese policy was
                  vastly increasing the risk to everyone. The Chinese government ignored the
                  protests. Then last week the inevitable happened and a Chinese pilot lost
                  his life. It is a miracle, and a tribute to one American pilot's skill, that 24
                  Americans did not go down with him.

                  Instead, they made an emergency landing in China, whereupon they were
                  taken hostage by the Chinese government. It is hardly surprising that the
                  Chinese government boarded the plane and searched it for information
                  about American intelligence-gathering capabilities, despite American
                  insistence that the plane remained, even in China, the sovereign territory of
                  the United States according to international law. What was a good deal
                  more surprising was the Chinese government's announcement of the
                  conditions for the crew's release: The American government would have to
                  make a formal apology.

                  There has been no end of speculation by America's revered China experts
                  as to why the Chinese would make such a baffling demand. The Chinese
                  government is getting ready for President Jiang Zemin's "retirement" in
                  2002, and during such moments of succession, would-be Chinese leaders
                  need to woo the powerful and virulently anti-American Chinese military
                  and intelligence services. In addition, there has been a surge of nationalist
                  fervor in China, especially since the accidental bombing of the Chinese
                  embassy in Belgrade two years ago. True, the Chinese government has
                  helped stir up these nationalist passions in an attempt to compensate for the
                  bankruptcy of Communist ideology. But now the government, we are told,
                  is the victim of its own device. No Chinese leader can afford to look "soft"
                  in a confrontation with the United States. Then there is the matter of
                  Chinese culture, which places an unusually high premium on honor and
                  "face." To admit Chinese error, or even to accept mutual responsibility for
                  this kind of accident, would cause the Chinese leadership to lose face and
                  suffer humiliation before its own people.

                  One or all of these explanations for Chinese behavior may be valid. But
                  even if every one of them contributed to the Chinese decision to hold the
                  American crew hostage until the United States apologized, it is abundantly
                  clear—from the known facts and the public record—that the Chinese
                  government's demand had two additional purposes.

                  First, it was a continuation of the policy that caused the accident in the first
                  place. The Chinese government has for some time been asserting that the
                  South China Sea and the skies above it are Chinese territory. Last week
                  President Jiang declared, "The United States must stop these types of
                  flights in the airspace of China's coastal areas. Only this will avoid a repeat
                  of this type of incident." An American apology would acknowledge not
                  merely that the American pilot was to blame for the accident. More
                  important, it would acknowledge that the American government was to
                  blame because it had "violated international law" by carrying out
                  surveillance flights "in the airspace of China's coastal waters."

                  The broader purpose of the Chinese demand was to inflict upon the United
                  States a public international humiliation. This, of course, is the flipside of
                  China's face-conscious culture. In such a culture, to lose face is not only
                  embarrassing. It is dangerous. It is a sign of weakness that invites repeated
                  exploitation by those who have witnessed it. To be deprived of face by
                  someone is in some sense to be vanquished and reduced to subservience.
                  He who makes another lose face is essentially declaring himself superior
                  and the other inferior, not worthy of respect. By demanding a public
                  apology from the United States, therefore, the Chinese government was
                  not only saving its own face, it was consciously and deliberately forcing the
                  United States to lose face, and thereby to admit its weakness.

                  One gets a sense that for a brief moment President Bush instinctively
                  understood all this. On Monday, April 2, a visibly angry Bush demanded
                  the "prompt and safe" return of the crew and the plane. Only 24 hours after
                  the accident, Bush said, "I am troubled by the lack of a timely Chinese
                  response to our request" for access to the crew, and he demanded that the
                  Chinese return the plane "without further damaging or tampering." China's
                  delay was "inconsistent with standard diplomatic practice and with the
                  expressed desire of both our countries for better relations."

                  On Tuesday, Bush seemed to be holding firm. Senior officials told
                  reporters he was increasingly angry at the Chinese failure to respond. One
                  adviser, after talking to Bush, told the Washington Post, "We've been
                  patient and we've been very reasonable, but at some point, patience wears
                  thin." Meeting the Chinese demand for an apology was out of the question:
                  "There's nothing to apologize for," said one official. Another also rejected
                  any statement of "regret." That was "not even in question." And Bush
                  officials explained why even a statement of regret would be a mistake. The
                  Chinese, they said, were measuring Bush and looking for "signs of
                  weakness." Even expressing "regret" would make Bush look like he was
                  afraid and caving to Chinese pressure.

                  There were signs even on Tuesday, however, that the administration's
                  resolve was weakening, and the Chinese no doubt saw them. The Post
                  article was aptly titled "U.S. Seeks to Avoid Test of Wills," which must
                  have struck the Chinese as both amusing and revealing, since what they
                  had set up was very much a test of wills, a test moreover in which there
                  would be a winner and a loser. And, indeed, while some officials were
                  talking tough, others were also suggesting that the Chinese needed to be
                  mollified somehow. "All the decisions are being driven by what is most
                  likely to be effective with the Chinese government," one official said. "One
                  of the things you want to do is give them time to come to the right decision
                  and not lock them into a position opposed to you."

                  The next day the Bush administration started to cave. It was Secretary of
                  State Colin Powell who delivered the statement that the whole world
                  understood as a partial capitulation to the Chinese demands for an
                  apology. Powell expressed his "regret" that the Chinese pilot had gone
                  down. He used the word "regret" twice. And by calling the collision a
                  "tragic accident," Powell removed the issue of blame. He then called for a
                  dialogue in which "both sides" could "present explanations." That evening
                  Powell sent a letter to the Chinese outlining a mechanism for discussing the
                  incident, including the creation of a bi-national commission to study what
                  had happened and ways to prevent such events in the future.

                  Powell's statement and letter were intended to address both of China's
                  main objectives in this whole affair. The statement of "regret" was meant to
                  address China's demand for a broad American apology and acceptance of
                  responsibility for the entire incident. In Europe, the headlines read: "U.S.
                  Regrets Plane Incident," leaving readers with the impression that the United
                  States was indeed accepting blame. And the Chinese made clear that they
                  took Powell's statements to be at least a partial apology. "The regret
                  expressed by the U.S. side," a Chinese spokesman declared, was "a step
                  in the right direction." Thus one purpose of the Chinese demand, the public
                  humiliation of the United States, was partially accomplished.

                  Powell's suggestion of a bi-national commission was also a step in the right
                  direction for the Chinese, because it would allow them to press home their
                  second objective: an agreement by the United States to pull back or at
                  least take greater care in its surveillance activities in the South China Sea.
                  After all, a bi-national commission cannot limit itself to the technical details
                  of which pilot turned in the wrong direction. The Chinese side is not simply
                  going to express hope that everyone's pilots be more careful in the future.
                  They are going to insist on discussing the root cause of the accident. And
                  for them, the root cause is that the United States is doing surveillance in the
                  South China Sea. Three months ago, the United States told the Chinese to
                  stuff it and stop harassing American planes engaged in legitimate
                  surveillance in international airspace. Now, if Powell's plan is agreed to, the
                  Chinese will have a forum in which to discuss with the Americans exactly
                  who can fly where.

                  In the safe and friendly confines of the United States, most observers
                  figured Powell's statements of regret were harmless—what could be wrong
                  with expressing "regret" over the death of a pilot? But in the real world,
                  and in Beijing's world, Powell's statements represented a partial
                  capitulation, with real-world consequences.

                  Having brought the United States to one knee, the Chinese government
                  kept up the pressure. Now it was time for the United States to go all the
                  way, to "adopt a cooperative attitude, admit its mistakes and make a
                  formal apology." As Lenin used to say, when your spear hits iron withdraw
                  it, when it hits flesh press forward.

                  In the face of continued Chinese pressure, President Bush showed signs of
                  cracking. Speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on
                  Thursday, Bush amplified Powell's statements of regret. He not only
                  regretted that the Chinese pilot had gone down, saying "our prayers go out
                  to the pilot, his family." Bush also regretted that "one of their airplanes has
                  been lost." He declared himself an "advocate of China's entering the
                  WTO." And then the groveling began in earnest. "China is a strategic
                  partner," Bush declared to the stunned audience, "I mean, a strategic
                  competitor. . . . But that doesn't mean we can't find areas in which we can
                  partner. And the economy is a place where we can partner."

                  Perhaps most significant was Bush's answer when asked if he might
                  consider apologizing to China. Instead of simply saying "no," President
                  Bush said, "I have no further comments on the subject." Bush's refusal to
                  rule out an apology surely encouraged the Chinese to believe that someday
                  the formal apology they have been demanding may be delivered. At this
                  writing, the Chinese are sticking to their demand for a full and formal
                  apology from the United States.

                  Now, it is possible that the American government will be able to negotiate
                  the release of the crew with something short of a full and formal apology.
                  Whatever the public and private terms of the deal, we will obviously be
                  happy for the crew and their families. But no one should ignore the
                  enormous price that will have been paid to secure their freedom. The
                  United States is on the path to humiliation, and for a great power—not to
                  mention the world's "sole superpower"—humiliation is not a matter to be
                  taken lightly. It is not just a petty issue of "face."

                  As the Chinese understand better than American leaders, President Bush
                  has revealed weakness. And he has revealed fear: fear of the political,
                  strategic, and economic consequences of meeting a Chinese challenge.
                  Having exposed this weakness and fear, the Chinese will try to exploit it
                  again and again, most likely in a future confrontation over Taiwan. The
                  American capitulation will also embolden others around the world who
                  have watched this crisis carefully to see the new administration's mettle
                  tested.

                  This defeat and humiliation, as another president once said, must not stand.
                  Whether or not the American hostages are released, President Bush and
                  members of Congress must begin immediately taking steps to repair the
                  damage already done. It is essential that the Chinese be made to pay a
                  price for their actions. Angry words and congressional resolutions of
                  disapproval are now worse than useless. Unless backed by deeds, they
                  will only confirm Beijing's perception of American weakness.

                  The United States must respond in ways that directly affect China's
                  interests. Congress can do its part easily: by rejecting China's
                  most-favored-nation trade status when it comes up for renewal later this
                  spring. The Chinese believe, with good reason, that the American business
                  community has a hammerlock on American policy toward China, and that
                  Congress will never dare cut off American business's access to the Chinese
                  market. Congress has a chance to prove that when matters of fundamental
                  national security are at stake, the United States can break this addiction.

                  The Bush administration can do its part by augmenting America's strategic
                  relationship with Taiwan and, above all, by selling Taiwan the weapons it
                  needs to maintain the cross-straits military balance. At its core, after all,
                  this entire crisis has really been about Taiwan—certainly from the Chinese
                  perspective. The Chinese now need to know that their efforts to force the
                  United States away from the defense of Taiwan cannot succeed. An
                  internal Pentagon review has made it clear that the balance is swiftly tilting
                  against Taiwan and that among the many things Taiwan needs is the Aegis
                  battle-management system. Later this month, the Bush administration will
                  have to decide whether or not the Taiwanese can purchase Aegis. Now,
                  more than ever, the answer must be yes. Not only is the sale of Aegis the
                  only appropriate response to Chinese behavior. But to decline to sell Aegis
                  now, after all that has happened, would only reconfirm the Chinese
                  impression that the United States is weak and afraid of confrontation.

                  Needless to say, we do not seek war with China. That is what advocates
                  of appeasement always say about those who argue for standing up to an
                  international bully. But it is the appeasers who wind up leading us into war.
                  We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six
                  years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace.
                  Whatever risks may accompany a policy of confrontation and containment,
                  the risks of weakness are infinitely greater. China hands both inside and
                  outside the administration will argue that this crisis needs to be put behind
                  us so that the U.S.-China relationship can return to normal. It is past time
                  for everyone to wake up to the fact that the Chinese behavior we have
                  seen this past week is normal. We have glimpsed the future. The only
                  question now is whether we have the wisdom and the strength to meet it.

                  By Robert Kagan and William Kristol