Nullifying
the press
The Bush team served up Scott McClellan's stolid stonewalling as the
perfect device
to humiliate and demote the media. And reporters played along.
by Jay Rosen as seen on salon.com
Scott McClellan was a different kind of press
secretary, sent to do a different job than the one people
had done from that podium before. Instead of
grouping him with a succession of other White House
spokesmen, a line to which he does not belong,
we have to take McClellan's job, call it a piece of the
puzzle, and place it alongside other pieces until
we recognize the larger political strategy he was a part of.
He's gone; the policy -- strategic noncommunication
-- may still be in place.
First, McClellan was a necessary figure in what
I have called "rollback" -- the attempt to downgrade the
press as a player within the executive branch,
to make it less important in running the White House and
governing the country. It had once been accepted
wisdom that by carefully "feeding the beast" an
administration would be rewarded with better
coverage in the long run. Rollback, the policy for which
McClellan signed on, means not feeding but starving
the beast, while reducing its effectiveness as an
interlocutor with the president and demonstrating
to all that the fourth estate is a joke.
As Nick Madigan of the Baltimore Sun wrote this
week, "No matter what the question, the president,
his press secretary and other officials usually
manage to deliver their position of the day without obstruction."
That's part of rollback.
"Back 'em up, starve 'em down, and drive up their
negatives" is how I summarized it in my post,
Rollback (July 16, 2005). "I believe the ultimate
goal is to enhance executive power and maximize
the president's freedom of maneuver -- not only
in policy-making, and warfare, but on the terrain of fact itself."
And I still believe that. So this is the first
thing to understand about McClellan and the job he was given
by Bush. He wasn't put there to brief the White
House press but to frustrate, and belittle it, and provoke
journalists into discrediting themselves on TV.
The very premise of a White House "communications"
office gets in the way of understanding the strategy
that prevailed from July 2003, when McClellan
took over from Ari Fleischer, until this week,
when he announced his resignation.
McClellan's specialty was noncommunication; what's
remarkable about him as a choice for press secretary
is that he had no special talent for explaining
Bush's policies to the world. In fact, he usually made things less
clear by talking about them. We have to assume
that this is the way the president wanted it; and if we do
assume that it forces us to ask: Why use a bad
explainer and a rotten communicator as your spokesman
before the entire world? Isn't that just dumb
-- and bad politics? Wouldn't it be suicidal in a media-driven
age with its 24-hour news cycle?
You would think so, but if the goal is to skate
through unquestioned -- because the gaps in your explanations
are so large to start with -- then to refuse
to explain is a demonstration of raw presidential power. (As in
"never apologize, never explain.") So this is
another reason McClellan was there. Not to be persuasive,
but to refute the assumption that there was anyone
the White House needed or wanted to persuade
-- least of all the press! Politics demands assent
on one hand and attack on the other. (And those are
your choices with Bush and Rove: Assent or be
attacked.) The very notion of persuasion conceded
more to democratic politics than the Bush forces
wanted to concede.
The same goes for spin. Anyone who talks about
McClellan "spinning" the press has got the wrong idea.
The premise of spin is that by artful restatement
the facts can be made to look better for the president.
But McClellan's speaking style is artless in
the extreme. He's terrible at spin, but it didn't detract from
the job he was there to do.
While claiming to hate spin, journalists grasp
that the very practice of it is an implied credit to their
profession; it means they're important! By sticking
someone up there who is inept at it, you downgrade
the press to unspun: why bother?
McClellan went through the motions of spin sometimes.
But he was far more comfortable with robotic
repetition of some empty formula he had decided
on in advance, like "We are focused on the priorities
that the American people care most about and
getting things done." His favorite word was "again," as in,
"Again, David, the president is focused on ..."
That isn't spin. That's running out the clock.
Spinning is improvisational. It requires you to
think on your feet. McClellan was terrible at that too:
wooden and unconvincing. He was not a phrase-maker,
and he had no natural eloquence. Grace under
pressure? No, that would concede that the reporters
pressing their questions are legitimate actors.
And so under pressure McClellan got more excruciatingly
thick-headed and often belligerent,
provoking belligerence back.
In what sense are these qualifications for the
job of press secretary? Well, McClellan was there to
make executive power more illegible, which is
the way Bush, Dick Cheney (especially Cheney) and
Karl Rove want it. Being inarticulate in public
is basic to that goal. Bush himself is that way when
he's not reading from a script. And as Madigan
noted, Bush's "aversion to detailed questions is palpable."
Michael Wolff, in an effective profile of McClellan
for Vanity Fair, noticed this. "Because Scott couldn't talk,
he wouldn't be able to say anything for himself,"
Wolff writes. "His lack of verbal acumen, his lack of
dexterity with a subordinate clause, becomes
another part of the way to control the White House
message in a White House obsessed with such control."
As Wolff notes, "He wouldn't be able to cozy up
to the press. That requires a serving-two-masters deftness.
A special tonal range. A wink. A nod. An emphasis.
A surgical use of modifiers, so that I say what I have to
say in such a way that we all understand what
I mean to say. A little Kabukiness." There has been none of
that "tonal range" under McClellan. The results
are ugly, but the public ugliness is a clue.
Wolff continues, "McClellan himself, as though
having some terrible social disability, has, standing miserably
in the press briefing room every day, become
a kick-me archetype. He's Piggy in 'Lord of the Flies': a living
victim, whose reason for being is, apparently,
to shoulder public ridicule and pain (or, come to think of it,
he's Squealer from 'Animal Farm'). He's the person
nobody would ever choose to be."
Right, the jerk at the podium. Ari Fleischer could
stonewall with ease, but he wasn't willing to be that jerk.
(Plus, he had a twinkle in his eye when in a
tough spot: no good.) And so the full development of rollback
and the illegible White House had to wait for
McClellan, the true-blue Texan and total Bush loyalist --
considered "family" according to Time's Mike
Allen.
Now all this is humiliating for the press to have
to endure but here the architects of rollback made a
shrewd bet. This is how I explained it to John
Harris, political editor of the Washington Post, in our
aborted interview on these subjects: "In my view,
the White House withdrew from a consensus
understanding of how the executive branch had
to deal with journalists. It correctly guessed that if it
changed the game on you, you wouldn't develop
a new game of your own, or be able to react."
And of course they didn't.
The era of news management lasted 40 years --
from 1963, when the networks first began their 30-minute
nightly broadcasts, to 2003, when McClellan,
Bush, Cheney and Rove proved there are other ways.
Replace news management with press nullification.
Drop the persuasion model in favor of the politics of assent.
Choose noncommunication to demonstrate that you
ought not to be questioned. (It only helps our enemies.)
Bush made no secret of his preference for government
by assent. That's why he created the Bush "bubble,"
a remarkable practice in which the White House
routinely prevented nonbelievers from attending the
president's speeches and asking questions of
him in public. (It's now being relaxed somewhat.)
Other parts of the Bush presidency that fit in
the puzzle with McClellan's hapless style:
* The fixing of facts around
the policy in the run-up to the war in Iraq; the cherry-picking and manipulation
of intelligence;
* The expansion of executive
secrecy and the conversion of public knowledge back into classified data;
* The routine refusal to provide
Congress with information required for meaningful oversight, which is itself
a casualty of this White House;
* The criminalization of reporting
practices in the prosecution of journalists for unauthorized leaks;
* Dick Cheney's conviction
that executive power had been encroached upon after Vietnam and Watergate,
and needed to be reclaimed: from Congress, from
the press, from the pressure of public opinion itself;
* The new "stealth" model for
the vice presidency that Cheney and Bush created, in which the V.P.'s
schedule is secret and the press often doesn't
know where he is.
Put it all together and what do we have? In calling
recently for Watergate-style Senate hearings on the
Bush presidency, Carl Bernstein (also in Vanity
Fair) wrote as follows:
"The first fundamental question that needs to
be answered by and about the president, the vice president,
and their political and national-security aides
... is whether lying, disinformation, misinformation, and
manipulation of information have been a basic
matter of policy -- used to overwhelm dissent; to hide
troublesome truths and inconvenient data from
the press, public, and Congress; and to defend the
president and his actions when he and they have
gone awry or utterly failed."
It's a good question. But I don't think it's fundamental
enough. McClellan was a cog in a machine for making
the executive power more opaque, and the presidency
itself less dialogic. (Fewer questions, no answers
unless under subpoena.) We have to understand
how this system works and why it has appeared now.
Bush and his staff did something new, I would
even say visionary, when they decided to "manage" the news
by shutting down those portions of the presidency
where the president can be asked the difficult but
necessary questions he loathes so much. Scott
McClellan, I believe, was sent into the briefing room
to shut off that tap even while he stood there
and took the beatings.
The intended result: a presidency that is less
questioned in the eyes of the world.
That's not news management; it's a new balance
of power between them and us. |